Yes, We Can Find the Exit
[I apologize for the lengthy post but the NY Times now makes you pay for Op-Ed pieces and, therefore, I couldn't link to the Web page. I thought Friedman's ideas were worth reading, though. Thanks, CP, for forwarding me the original article.]
February 7, 2007
Op-Ed Columnist
Yes, We Can Find the Exit
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
MOSCOW
Listening, from Moscow, to the debate in Congress about Iraq is troubling: it sounds as if the American people are being offered two routes to a dead end: either follow President Bush and have troops surging into a roiling civil war, or go with one of the Congressional resolutions and denounce the surge, but without any alternative strategy for securing U.S. interests.
I believe there is an alternative strategy, but it will take two concrete numbers to implement: a date — Dec. 1 — and a price — $3.50 cents a gallon. Let me explain.
What is the U.S. interest in Iraq right now? It's to quell the civil war enough so the parties may eventually reach a negotiated settlement, and if that proves impossible, to get America out of Iraq with the least damage to our interests.
We will not quell this civil war with a surge of troops alone. The only thing that will do that is a power-sharing, oil-revenue-sharing deal between the parties. The only way we will get serious negotiations going is with leverage that America does not now have: leverage on the parties inside and outside Iraq. Negotiating in the Middle East without leverage is futile. These folks know how to calculate the balance of power down to the last ounce.
So how do we get leverage? The first way to do that is by setting a firm date to leave — Dec. 1. All U.S. military forces are either going to be home for Christmas 2007 or redeployed along the borders of Iraq, away from the civil war.
Right now everyone in Iraq is having their cake and eating it — at our expense. We have to change that.
The Sunnis, who started this whole murderous cycle, participate in the government, negotiate with us and also indulge the suicide bombers and the insurgents. The Shiites collaborate with us, run their own retaliatory death squads and dabble with Iran. The Saudis tell us we can't leave, but their mosques and charities funnel Sunni suicide bombers to Iraq and dollars to insurgents. Iran pushes its Iraqi Shiite allies to grab more power, while helping others kill U.S. troops. Ditto Syria.
O.K., boys, party's over: we're leaving by Dec. 1. From now on, everyone pays retail for their politics. We will no longer play host to a war where we're everyone's protector and target. If you Sunnis want to go on resisting, we'll leave you to the tender mercies of the Shiites, who vastly outnumber you. You Shiites, if you want to run Iraq without compromising with Sunnis, fine, but you'll have to fight them alone and then risk having to live under the thumb of Iran.
You Saudis and other Arabs, if you don't use your influence to delegitimize Sunni suicide bombers and press Iraq's Sunnis to cut a deal, we won't protect you from the consequences. And Iran, you win — yes, if we leave, you win the right to try to manage Iraq's Shiites. Have a nice day.
But at the same time, we have to impose a tax that creates a floor price of $3.50 a gallon for gasoline — forever. This is also about leverage. It says to all the parties: we are going to conserve enough gasoline and spur enough clean alternatives to fossil fuels that no matter what you all do in the Middle East, we will not depend on you for energy.
Today in Iraq, none of the key parties have to make any choices, and we don't have any choices. That is the definition of "stuck." Right now we can win only if all the parties in and around Iraq act in the most farsighted and flexible manner. Otherwise we lose in our attempt to democratize Iraq, and we're left holding the bag. We need to be in a win-win situation that we control.
"I don't think at this stage that the promise of 20,000 more troops will change any minds in Iraq," said Michael Mandelbaum, author of "The Case for Goliath." "But the threat of a lot fewer U.S. troops might conceivably get everyone focused. Right now, the U.S. is the passenger in a car that other countries are driving — and it's not going in the right direction. We have to change that dynamic."
Indeed we do. Once we've set a date to leave by and a gas price to live by, we, for the first time, will have choices in Iraq. We can stay to broker a deal if the parties want to be guided by their better angels or, if they want tribal instincts to reign, we can leave by Dec. 1 and insulate ourselves from Islam's civil war with a new energy policy.
To put it another way, if setting a date to leave miraculously brings them to their senses, our aspirations for the Iraqis will have been achieved, and we'll be stronger. And if it doesn't, but we have set an exit date and a gas price, we'll be out of Iraq and more energy-secure — and we'll also be stronger.
posted by ze roberto @ 2/07/2007 04:22:00 PM
6 comments
6 Comments:
Very interesting article, with some good points and ideas. However, it doesn't seem to address the main alleged drawback to an American withdrawal from Iraq: the "terrorist haven" theory.
Once we got sick enough of Iraqis killing Iraqis, Iraqis killing American soldiers, and god-knows-who-insurgants killing American soldiers to not care (on a theoretical "Everyone deserves a democracy!" level) whether Iraq ended up a democracy or not, the big issue seems to have become "What happens to Iraq if we leave WITHOUT it being a wonderful, America-loving democracy?". The anti-leaving answer has been that a power vacuum will turn Iraq into a chaotic nightmare and, with nobody truly in charge or able to impose rule of law across the country, terrorists will be able to set up shop and use Iraq as a home base for terrorist acts all over the world (a la Afghanistan pre-9/11). Pro-leaving advocates tend to counter with "What exactly gives you the impression that we don't have that chaotic, lawless situation now? Let's get out and at least eliminate the killing of American soldiers and wasting of American money on these jokers."
This piece seems to imagine a scenario where Shiites control the government and country, and have to either power-share or fight Sunni insurgants, and Sunnis either have to negotiate with Shiites or face a rebellion in which they're the minority. Tough choices that might force compromise.
But these scenarios seem to imply a level of control on the part of the Shiites over Iraq that I'm not sure is in keeping with reality. The real worse-case-scenario is Sunni gunmen controlling some pockets of territory, Shiite gunman (called Iraqi Army, death squads, whatever) controlling more pockets based on their size, and some areas being law-free zones. In this scenario, terrorists (assuming that once the US leaves, neither side will want to explicitly let them hang around - which might be too much to assume) fall into these no-mans-lands where nobody has control and strike out at the world (and, in particular, the US).
Friedman has to at least address this before we can evaluate his theories on a practical level. If he can provide cogent facts or arguments as to why this scenario is merely a political scare tactic, terrific! I'm on board. If not, his theories need fleshing out.
I'm not saying that Friedman has everything figured out--I think we can all agree that this issue will require a far more detailed plan than would fit in an op-ed column. I do believe, though, that he addresses the terrorist haven theory with his call for a power-sharing, oil-revenue-sharing Iraqi government. I don't believe that he's advocating for a US withdrawal regardless of the consequences. I think his main point is that the US needs some sort of leverage to shake things up in Iraq and move the interested parties to action. This is where the Dec. 1 deadline for withdrawal and the pre-set gas price comes in. It swings the pendulum back to the US in terms of influence; right now, we're stuck in a no-win situation. With some leverage, we have a far better chance of forcing some positive movement. However, as the old adage goes, you can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink. So, even if we establish some semblance of peace, bring the Sunnis and Shiites to the table, and get Iran, Syria, and Saudia Arabia on board; the Iraqis are still going to have to want this bad enough to overcome their differences and work together. If we can at least get to them the table, though, then I believe we've done the best we can.
Sorry Rob, I wasn't trying to imply that you were posting Friedman's piece as THE ANSWER to the situation that you'd adopted or anything. I was more responding to Friedman. I agree that his general idea of making a move to gain leverage is crucial. While I agree that if the Iraqis go the power sharing, revenue sharing route he advocates as the best case, that might address the terrorist haven question because there would be a functioning government and rule of law. However, I'm worried about his alternative scenario.
He appears to say "With my idea, we gain leverage that will hopefully push folks to our best case scenario. If it doesn't, who cares? We still have extricated ourselves from a civil war and made the Middle East less vital to us because we're controlling the energy issue. Since its less vital, it won't matter much to us if the situation goes to hell."
My point is that the second part of his "win-win" doesn't take into account the terrorist haven issue, only the need-for-oil issue. The oil issue may have been the only one keeping us embroiled in the Middle East in decades past, but its no longer our only concern.
Okay, I know I said I was just visiting, but I guess I lied. I would posit there are terrorists havens all over that region. Us staying there, or sending more troops or anything else won't change that. That ship sailed when we invaded. I believe Friedman's position is that the ONLY leverage we have is the threat of leaving, and forcing this entire region to figure this problem out. Not to say we can't play a role from a diplomatic, or peace-keeping or whatever standpoint. But, Iraq is currently and will remain a terrorist haven. In my humble opinion, that won't change no matter what we do.
Maybe if the Administration had spent as much time, money, resources, lives, and political capital figuring out how to "protect the Homeland" and not so much of those precious commodities fighting a godforsaken and Quixotic war, we wouldn't care if and where and whethere there were terrorists (at least not as much...) We'd have a national security that was dynamic and fully-funded and a priority. Is that so hard for these ass clowns to figure out?
I'm with you on this one, Sean. I would imagine that instability in Iraq, or even the Middle East as a whole, is a "million miles away" problem for most people in this country. Moreover, I support Friedman's albeit simple plan to implement an ultimatum fueled withdraw schedule. I'm having a hard time understanding what we are trying to accomplish at this point. Winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people is an unattainable goal. Imposing our own description of peace on a centuries old hostility among the various tribes and parties within Iraq is equally unattainable. We need to put aside our cavalier "never run" position on this ordeal, and bring our security focus back home. Carolyn is absolutely correct in suggesting that terrorist camps have and will always thrive in the region, leaving me to believe that we are better suited to address how to keep them out of our country rather than continue a costly vigilante agenda to fight them abroad.
Post a Comment
<< Home